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A "New International Financial Architecture?"Reflections on the Possible Law-Based Dimension
JOSEPH

J. NORTON*

I. Introduction
The onset of the recent series of financial crises in East Asia and worldwide was generated
by fundamental economic, political, and financial market errors and weaknesses, and also
by exaggerated and disproportionate market reaction to these vulnerabilities, as their extent
was revealed at this time.' For example, in each case in East Asia, once the domestic crisis
was triggered by forced abandonment of an exchange rate peg, it was apparently the combination of pegged exchange rates, high leverage ratios, weak banking and financial systems,
declining demand both domestically and elsewhere, and increased competition from other
countries such as China and India that transformed a correction into a collapse, and that
precipitated "contagion" to other countries experiencing a similar range of underlying vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, in turn, appear to stem, in large part, in each affected
country from a combination of macroeconomic imbalances, weak financial institutions,
widespread corruption, moral hazard, lack of system and institutional decision-making
transparency, improper sequencing in the liberalization process, and an inadequate legal

*Joseph J. Norton, SJ.D. University of Michigan, D.Phil. (Oxon), is the James L. Walsh Distinguished
Faculty Fellow and Professor of Financial Institution Law, SMU School of Law, Dallas, Texas; Sir John
Lubbock Professor of Banking Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London; and Vice
Chancellor's Distinguished Visiting University Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong (1999-2000). The
author expresses his appreciation to the research funding support provided by the Dorothy & Richard Lee
Trust at the SMU School of Law. Portions of this article have been derived, in part, from various formal
presentations on global financial sector reform issues made by the author in the United Kingdom, Germany,
Egypt, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, and South Africa.
1. A good explanation of this viewpoint is that of Charles Wyplosz of the Graduate Institute of International
Studies, Geneva, and the Centre for Economic Policy Research in London. See Charles Wyplosz, Globalised
Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Conference Paper for Coping with Financial Crises in Developing and
Transition Countries: Regulatory and Supervisory Challenges in a New Era of Global Finance, Forum on
Debt and Development, Amsterdam (Mar. 16-17, 1998), available at <http://heiwww.unige.ch/-wyplosz/
fondad.pdf>. See also Rudi Dombusch, Asian Crisis Themes, (Feb. 1998), available at <http://web.mit.edu/
rudi/www/papers.html>; Paul Krugman, What Happenedto Asia?, (Jan. 1998), available at <http://web.mit.edu/
krugman/www/ DISINTER.html>; and S. RADELET & J. SACHo, THE ONSET OF THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISES, (1998).
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foundation.2 This article observes that most, if not all, of these vulnerabilities can be viewed
as law-basedfailures and should be addressed to a significant degree within that context.
In effect, a main emphasis of this article concerns the importance of ongoing and meaningful (bottom-up) economic, financial, and commercial law reform throughout emerging
and transition economies and the related enhancement of legal education in these subjectmatter areas. In this sense, this article suggests further that in looking forward, these emerging countries need to consider the critical importance of a law-based "building block"
approach in addressing the long-term implications of the current financial crises.
Yet in looking to the future to see what emerging economies should be doing prospectively, preemptively, and over the long-term to help ensure sound economic, political, and
financial markets fundamentals are in place in order to avoid or, at least, to minimize the
effects of a future crisis, domestic efforts cannot and should not occur in isolation. These
need to be the result of the collective international, regional, and domestic initiatives taken
in this regard. Whether these efforts and initiatives amount to, or should amount to, a "new
international financial architecture" (NIFA) is the subject of significant current debate.' In
trying to decipher the meaning and practical implications of the NIFA, this article postulates
that at minimum, any meaningful and effective NIFA should comprise a significant lawbased component or dimension.
Rather than looking in detail at the factual background to recent financial crises, this
article instead, first, will focus on the main vulnerabilities that caused or exacerbated the
recent crises. Then, it discusses the web of interlinked "quasi-legal, global standards" that
are being developed to assist countries to prepare their individual financial systems for the
realities of a world of globalized financial markets, and of other broader elements of financial
sector law reform. Consideration is also given to the relationship of such standard-setting
process to the broad and ongoing global phenomenon of convergence in financial markets
and supervisory standards.
In addition, this article addresses some of the main thematic strands of law-based reform.
After reflecting on some of the main areas of the unfinished agenda for meaningful financial
sector reform in the emerging economies, this article concludes that the NIFA nomenclature is a vague, but critical "code word" or point of reference for the ongoing search for
coherency, meaning, effectiveness, and some semblance of structure within what essentially
has become a highly fragmented and volatile "non-system."
II. Submerged Fragilities Necessitate a Law-Based Approach
As alluded to above, the underlying fragilities or vulnerabilities in recent financial crises
resulted, in large part, from a combination of macroeconomic imbalances, weak financial

2. Cf. Implications ofAsian FinancialCrisis: Hearing Before the House of Representatives, Comm. on Banking and
Fin. Serv., Gan. 30, 1998) (Statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys.) [hereinafter Implicationsof Asian FinancialCrisis].
3. See, e.g., Michel Camdessus, From the Asian Crisis Toward a New Global Architecture, Address Before
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, June 23, 1998, available at (visited Oct. 8, 1999)
<http:www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/062398.htm>; and Michel Camdessus, The Role of the IMF:
Past, Present, and Future, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee (Feb. 13, 1998)
available at (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/021398.htm>. For a more
recent authoritative and comprehensive elaboration on the NIFA, see Report of G7 Finance Ministers to the
K61n Economic Summit Gune 18-20, 1999) [hereinafter Cologne Report].
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institutions, widespread corruption, inadequate legal foundations, moral hazard problems,
improper sequencing in the liberalization process, and political instability or uncertainties
in each of the affected countries. Such vulnerabilities, in and of themselves, present a strong
argument for a law-based approach to the NIFA. To illustrate this point, this section will
touch upon, in a preliminary manner, the latter three vulnerabilities. The subjects of weak
financial institutions, corruption, and inadequate legal foundations are touched upon in
Parts Ell and IV.
A. MORAL

HAZARD AND THE ROLE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM

Most analyses agree on a fimdamental role of the banking system in explaining recent
financial crises. This line of reasoning suggests that a significant problem in these cases was
excessive bank lending following financial market liberalization. Domestic banking crises
are common in developing countries for a variety of reasons; often they are the result of
bad lending practices, exacerbated by political influences on bank lending or actual policy
lending to state-owned enterprises or politically favored enterprises, and, in many cases,
underpinned by corrupt or questionable and non-transparent business practices. These
problems are further exacerbated when banks' primary source of fimds is borrowing in an
unhedged foreign currency, because in the event of currency pressures, domestic on-loans
go into default, worsening domestic lenders' balance sheets as their own currency position
worsens due to external unhedged borrowing. Given investor overreaction leading to denial
of roll-over treatment for existing debts, a domestic crisis quickly takes on regional and
even international proportions. Importantly, all of these problems are exacerbated by a
financial system that is fragile, and poorly regulated and supervised.
It has long been realized that financial intermediaries whose liabilities are guaranteed by
the government pose a serious moral hazard problem: the U.S. savings and loan debacle is
4
the classic example. The case in recent financial crises, however, is more murky because
financial institutions' creditors did not receive explicit guarantees, but rather perceived that
they would be protected from risk due to implicit guarantees, enforced by the politicization
of the respective financial systems. In any event, if institutions believe that because of political connections or pressures they will not be allowed to fail, this may plant the seeds for
5
excessive financial risk-taking and eventual bad debt problems. A viable legal infrastructure,
with effective implementation and enforcement, underpinning a banking system should
significantly reduce these moral hazard concerns.
As to the existence of a deposit insurance scheme and moral hazard, in this author's view
a properly constructed and implemented deposit insurance scheme, on balance, brings more
benefits of public confidence than systemic risks to a banking system. Such a system should
be a "risk-based one," funded by the banking sector, and should be of limited amount, and
should not be a 100 percent insurance guarantee for all depositors.

B.

IMPROPER SEQUENCING OF LIBERALIZATION

Analysis suggests that financial market liberalization may be the best predictor of financial
crisis: this has been true in Latin America and the United States in the 1980s, in Europe
4. See Krugman, supra note 1. For a detailed discussion, see G.N. Olson, Banks in Distress: Misdirection in
Public Policy and Law (forthcoming 1999).
5. For discussion of these moral hazard situations arising within the Thailand context, see T. Traisorat, The
Thai Crisis of 1997-98: An Opportunity to Re-address the Fundamentals,THAMMASAT UNIv. L. J.
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in the early 1990s, in Mexico in 1994, in Asia in 1997, and in Russia in 1998.6 In recent
financial crises, financial liberalization lifted some restrictions before putting in place a
sound regulatory and legal framework.7 Again, a sound legal infrastructure might well have
mitigated such adverse effects of rapid liberalization.
In terms of self-fulfilling crises, financial liberalization makes attacks possible and exposes
underlying vulnerabilities to the vagaries of international capital markets; this tension between
market liberalization and systemic stability, safety, and soundness needs to be better understood and appreciated by all. The lesson is that financial liberalization should be contemplated
only when the situation is ripe. First, significant financial weaknesses, such as banking system
weaknesses, large external debt, high unemployment, and unsettled macroeconomic conditions, must be eliminated. Second, countries that accept full capital mobility must sacrifice
either fixed exchange rates or monetary policy independence. Monetary policy independence
requires a reasonably flexible exchange rate, while a tight exchange rate requires the abandonment of monetary policy independence, for instance through a currency board arrangement. Full capital liberalization should be the last step of this process.
C.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND UNCERTAINTY

In each recent financial crisis, perceptions of political uncertainty and instability were
significant causes of the initial confidence crisis among external investors. Perceptions of
weakness and inability of the respective governments to deal with underlying economic
problems, uncertainty over the capabilities of leaders and, in many cases, upcoming elections caused investors to question the political stability of the various countries that eventually required bailouts. Political problems also impeded the implementation of appropriate
political responses to the impending and developing financial problems in each instance.
A lesson from these financial crises is that countries with weak and indecisive governments
and institutions in conjunction with other underlying vulnerabilities are more likely to suffer
external or internal confidence crises than those countries with perceived strong and decisive governments and capable institutions. Further, such governments and institutions
have the potential to severely worsen the effect of any crisis or contagion through their
ineptitude and inability to demonstrate firm and clear policy commitments. Sound legal
and constitutional systems, and a firm embrace of the rule of law, can help provide political
stability even in the face of political uncertainties.
IL. Coping With Future Crises: A Preemptive Move
Toward a Law-Based Approach
The collective interconnection of major developing emerging countries into the international financial system implies that disturbances in any other market, whether developed
or developing, can be rapidly translated in the form of financial contagion into developed
or developing markets. Empirical investigations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and other international organizations have confirmed that the increase in cross-border capital flows over the past ten years, most notably through portfolio investment, has bound

6. See Wyplosz, supra note 1, at 2, 10-11.
7. See Joseph Stiglitz, What CausedAsia's Crash? Bad Private-SectorDecisions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at

A22.
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national capital markets more closely together and that the cross-border translation of

disturbances can occur with unnerving speed. This concept was reinforced by the ensuing
contagion from the Mexican and East Asian crises extending to other countries in the region
and worldwide, as most countries in these regions, even those with fundamentally sound
economic indicators, experienced temporary exchange and equity market disturbances during the respective crises.'
According to Alan Greenspan, vicious crisis cycles such as those in Mexico in 1994 and
Asia in 1997 and 1998 may in fact be a defining characteristic of today's high-tech international financial system.9 As a result, while human panic reactions may not be controllable,
at least the imbalances that exacerbate them can be addressed, preferably in advance.
According to Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, in order to
avoid crises, a country needs both sound macroeconomic policies and a strong financial
system. 10 A sound macroeconomic policy framework is one that promotes growth by keeping inflation low, the budget deficit small, and the current account sustainable. Unfortunately, what became apparent all too readily with the unfolding of the East Asian financial
crises is that the IMF had no "magic formula," that earlier IMF experiences with central
and eastern Europe and Mexico were not readily transportable to East Asia; that there could
be no model approach for all troubled East Asian countries; and that uncertainty exists
about whether history will judge the IMF approach on East Asia as a curative foundation
for recovery or as an exacerbating factor for further economic recession or depression in
the region.
The critical role of a strong financial system was becoming clear before the Mexican
crisis; it was crystal clear in that crisis and its aftermath; and it has been equally clear in the
East Asian crises and their aftermath. In this respect, Greenspan notes his own primary
factors that have been present in international and economic disruptions, but which appear
in more stark relief today, namely:" excessive leverage;"2 interest rate and currency risk;"
weak banking systems;' 4 interbank funding, especially in foreign currencies;" moral
8. See International Monetary Fund, International CapitalMarkets: Developments, Prospects and Key Polity
Issues (1997); idem., International Capital Markets (1995) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/icfm/97icm/
icmcon.htm>.
9. ImplicationsofAsian FinancialCrisis, supra note 2.
10. Stanley Fischer, How to Avoid International Financial Crises and the Role of the InternationalMonetary
Fund, Address Before the 15th Annual Cato Institute Monetary Conference (Oct. 14, 1997) availableat (visited
Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1997/101497.hm>.
11. Implicationsof Asian FinancialCrisis, supra note 2.
12. Exceptionally high leverage is often a symptom of excessive risk-taking that leaves financial systems and
economies vulnerable to loss of confidence. This concern is particularly relevant to banks and other financial
intermediaries whose assets typically are less liquid than their liabilities and so depend on confidence in the
payment of liabilities for their continued viability. Further, excessive leverage can create problems for lenders
that can in turn spread to other borrowers that rely on those lenders. This is particularly the case in Korea and
in Japan. Id.
13. Banks, because of their nature, lend long and fund short, thereby incurring interest rate or liquidity risk.
This exposes them to shocks, especially those institutions with low capital-asset ratios. These problems are
exacerbated when financial intermediaries borrow in unhedged foreign currency, with the result of potential
bank runs following the collapse of the domestic currency. Id.
14. When banks are undercapitalized, have lax lending standards, and are subject to weak supervision and
regulation, they become a source of systemic risk, both domestically and internationally. Id.
15. Despite its importance for distributing savings to their most valued use, short-term interbank funding,
especially cross-border, may turn out to be the "Achilles heel" of an international financial system that is subject
to wide variations in confidence. Id.
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hazard; 16 weak central banks; 7 underdeveloped securities markets;s and inadequate legal
structures. 19 As put forth above, this author would suggest that in fact most, if not all, of
these problems are related to "law-based failures."
A.

LAw-BASED APPROACH: SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

A law-based approach invariably should entail a broad rule-oriented framework where
unfettered discretion, non-transparency and cronyism must give way. But such a framework
should not only be broad in its scope, it should be deep in its implementation. As such, a
comprehensive and coordinated framework will need to entail and to interconnect the
legislative, administrative, supervisory, examination, enforcement, and judicial administration processes of the country.
Yet, a law-based approach to the economic regulation of the financial sector is not simply
about laws and legal processes: law is merely one societal means to achieving and legitimizing
appropriate policy objectives. In the area of financial sector reform, this chapter suggests
that a law-based approach also should be an interdisciplinary approach, where law is the
thread that weaves together economic, political, and social objectives with a transparent
and fair implementation process, and where the lawyers should work closely with the economists, policymakers, operational people, and the accountants.
The source of the new rules is a rather complex proposition. On the one hand, they have
been evolving, over the past two decades, through a complex matrix of "soft-law" initiatives
by and among a variety of international financial organizations and institutions. On the
other hand, they have been shaped by the particular realities of economic law efforts in
individual countries. Associated with all of this have been the diverse influences of varying
regional and subregional configurations.
In any event, the commitment to a law-based financial sector reform program needs to
be a long-term societalcommitment whereby the notion of a process based upon a rule of law

becomes ingrained within and throughout the fabric of civil, political, and economic societies in emerging economies, in a substantive manner and not merely as a facade.
Achieving and sustaining this long-term commitment will depend, in large part, on the
development of a strong and vibrant educational infrastructure involving new university
educational approaches to the teaching of financial law-related subjects on an interdisci-

16. The expectation that monetary authorities or international financial institutions will come to the rescue

of failing financial systems and unsound investments has clearly engendered a significant element of moral
hazard and excessive risk-taking. Further, the dividing line between public and private liabilities too often
becomes blurred. Interest and currency risk-taking, excessive leverage, weak financial systems, and inappropriate interbank funding are all encouraged by the existence of an excessive safety net (e.g., U.S. S&L crisis)
or perceptions of the existence of an excessive safety net (e.g., East Asia). Id.
17. To effectively support a stable currency, central banks need to be independent, i.e., their monetary

policy decisions are not subject to the dictates of political authorities. Id.
18. Recent adverse banking experiences have emphasized the problems that can arise if banks are almost the
sole source of financial intermediation. Their breakdown induces a sharp weakening in economic growth.
Therefore, a wider range of non-bank institutions, including viable debt and equity markets, are important

safeguards of economic activity when banking fails. Id.
19. An effective competitive market system requires a rule of law that severely delimits government's arbitrary intrusion into commercial disputes. While defaults and restructuring are in some circumstances unavoida beneficial element of renewal in a market economy, an efficient bankruptcy statute is required
able and in fact
to aid in this process, including in the case of cross-border defaults. Id.
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plinary basis, and to new approaches to bureaucratic and judicial training. In a sense a new
partnership must be forged among the academic, bureaucratic, judicial, and practical business and financial worlds in order to ensure that this interdisciplinary educational infrastructure comes into being and becomes an integral part of the overall financial sector
reform process, which embodies not simply an enactment stage, but also an effective administrative implementation stage, an effective administrative and judicial enforcement
stage, and meaningful monitoring and readjustment mechanisms. Here, key governmental
bureaucracies having interdisciplinary components and leading universities having strong
law, economic and accounting faculties can play the most constructive and catalytic roles.

B.

THE RISE OF A GLOBAL PUBLIC FINAaNciL

LAW

1. The HistoricalContext
Prior to the 1970s, many governments and financial market regulators operated on the
premise that financial market stability required limitations on competition and a segmented

market structure that segregated international banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. In particular, the perception of the banking and securities industries as separate and
distinct generally eased the supervisory oversight of these industries. This has occurred

principally due to the clearly delineated and understood legal and market distinctions between these different types of financial institutions.2 0
However, in the late 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s and now the 1990s, technological and financial innovation began to facilitate competition within and across these industry
segments. This initiated the process of regulatory adaptation to defacto changes in market
structure and financial institutions. Restrictions on permissible activities were relaxed gradually and market access for domestic and foreign competitors expanded, resulting in net
efficiency gains to the international financial system. Nonetheless, international banks still

engaged primarily in traditional forms of intermediation, namely the business of taking
money from investors and depositors and lending it to corporate and residential borrowers.
Credit risk was the major risk incurred by these financial institutions, since interest rate
risk could be managed by ensuring that the contractual interest rate on the loaned funds
varied with the cost of funds.2
In the mid-1980s, in the midst of the Lesser Developed Country (LDC) sovereign debt
crisis, the vulnerability of individual banks and the international financial system increased
exponentially, and bank exposure to credit risk dominated the regulatory agenda.22 The
LDC debt crisis, which in fact transformed itself into a world debt crisis, led to international
prudential efforts, centralized in the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, to
strengthen systemic defenses to credit risk through the issuance of risk-based capital standards in the 1988 Capital Accord. 3 The Capital Accord focused on the credit risk of

20. Cf. Roy C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANKING (1997).

21. See Janet L. Yellen, Address Before the Conference on Recent Developments in the Financial System,
Jerome Levy Economic Institute of Bard College (Apr. 11, 1996), available in LEXIS Banking Library.
22. See PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND RESCHEDULINGS (Joseph J. Norton, ed. 1988); C.T.
Ebenroth, Innovations in LDC Debt Conversions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN THE 1990S: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIEs (Joseph J. Norton & Ray Auerback eds., 1993).

23. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, InternationalConvergenceofCapitalMeasurementandCapital
Standards (July 1988) [hereinafter the Capital Accords].
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international banks because such banks, as the main providers of payment services, were
the primary interconnective media of economic transactions, and because liquidity and
credit exposures were naturally concentrated within the banking system. In addition, banks
normally channeled the intermediation of short-term funds into long-term non-marketable
assets, thus making banks more susceptible to credit risk and public confidence problems
24
than other institutions.
2. The Changing Context
In the past decade, traditional bank intermediation has changed dramatically: large nonbank institutions, including securities firms, finance companies, insurance companies, pension funds, and other collective funds and trusts, have become major players in the intermediation process and forced banks to expand their range of financial activities into the
other previously segmented industries. Hence, in the 1990s, international banks have been
significantly expanding the scope of their activities into areas that directly impact and/or
reallocate credit risk, thereby exposing them to differentiating types of risk not previously
under supervisory scrutiny.25
The expansion of banks into non-traditional activities has spawned the realization that
financial risks could be desegregated, separately priced and traded in global financial markets. This realization is having important implications for international financial market
supervision and regulation. Particular types of risk are no longer confined to specific institutional categories. As such, financial institutions have come to recognize that unbundled
risks can be recombined in ways reflecting the risk profiles of financial institutions that until
recently have been characterized as separate and unique. This explosion of financial product
innovation raised, and continues to raise, a host of new legal and practical issues, both
public and industry, that needed to be addressed within the expanding parameters of public
financial law.26
The recent Basle Committee amendments to credit risk-based capital requirements are
of great importance to international financial institutions. 7 These amendments have been
arguably overshadowed, however, by the coordinated but unbalanced efforts of international
banking supervisors and securities regulators towards regulatory convergence for similar
activities and in certain areas of risk management, particularly market risk. Yet, the globalization of financial activities leads inescapably to the reality of greater communication,
cooperation, and coordination among bank supervisors and securities regulators on a
broader, international basis.2s

24. See IMF Background PaperI, CapitalAdequacy and Internal Risk Management, INT'L CAP. MARKETS: DEPROSPECTS, AND PoL'Y DEVELOPMENTS, Aug. 1995, at 136-37 n.2. See also JOSEPH J. NORTON,

VELOPMENTS,

DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS

190-200 (1995) (explaining in detail the 1988 Capital

Accord).
25. See, e.g., A. Crockett, The Future of Banking Regulation, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 272-73.
26. Cf. John Howard Jackson, RegardingInternationalEconomic Behaviors-Reflections on the BroaderSettings
of InternationalFinancial Markets and Institutions, in EMERGING MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS,

ch. 2 (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds., 1996).

27. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Basle CapitalAccord: Treatment of Potential Exposurefor
Off-Balance Sheet Items (Apr. 1995), available at <http://www.bis.org> [hereinafter Capital Accord Amendment].

28. Cf. GEORGE

SoRos, THE CRISES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM

VOL. 33, NO. 4
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Following the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 and 1995 and the U.S. and international
rescue operation that it required, leaders of industrial nations recognized the need to develop
29
mechanisms to deal with the potentially systemic dangers of such financial crises. In re1996,
(G-7)
in
June
of
Seven
of
the
Group
Summit
at
the
Lyon
an
initiative
sponse to
representatives of the countries in the Group of Ten (G-10) and of emerging market and
transition economies jointly sought to develop a strategy for fostering financial stability
through the analysis of key experiences in previous crises and to elucidate basic standards
30
and principles to guide individual nations in developing stronger financial systems. This
study concluded that a financial system that is robust is less susceptible to the risk of a crisis
in the wake of real economic disturbances and is more resilient in the face of crises that do
occur.
1. The StandardSetting
As a result of the international attention to the requirements of sound financial systems,
the G-7 directed a number of international organizations to develop agreed minimum
principles and standards necessary to be implemented in order to encourage and improve
confidence in and viability of domestic financial systems. The aim of such standards is to
promote sound financial institutions, to minimize systemic risk, and to encourage savings
and investment activity through increased confidence in financial markets, both domestically and internationally. It must be noted at the outset, however, that these international
principles and standards are just that: minimum internationally agreed upon guidelines that
leave wide latitude in their implementation and effectiveness.
The development of this emerging consensus on the requirements for financial stability
can be seen as the result of two separate series of events since the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system in 1972. These series of events can be classified along two axes, one based
on the experience of the developed economies and one based on experiences within emerging economies. First, the growth of international cooperation and the establishment of
minimum standards in the area of regulation of financial institutions has come to be viewed
as essential in order to maintain and to strengthen the confidence and integrity of the
international financial system. This trend is reflected in the evolving role of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision as a response to various crises involving international financial institutions since the 1970s, and the increasing importance and effectiveness of its
3
pronouncements in the area of financial institution regulation and supervision. ' Further,
to the deimportance
international cooperation in this area continues to be of increasing
veloped economies as financial technological innovation and internationalization continues
at a rapid rate, as demonstrated by recent intense focus on the areas of derivatives and
payment and settlement systems throughout the world.2

29. See Douglas Arner, The Mexican Peso Crisis:Implicationsfor the Regulation of FinancialMarkets, 2 NAFTA:
L. & Bus. REV. Am. 28 (1996).

30. See Group of Ten (G- 10), A Strategy for the Formulation,Adoption and Implementation ofSound Princples
and Practices to Strengthen Financial Systems, Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies (Apr. 1997),
available at <http://www.bis.org> [hereinafter Group of Ten].
31. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core PrinciplesforEffective BankingSuperviFion (Sept. 1997),
available at <http://www.bis.org>.
32. Cf. Douglas Arner, An Analysis ofInternationalSupport Packagesin the Mexican and Asian FinancialCrises,
J. Bus. L., July 1998, at 380; and Joseph J. Norton, The Thai Financial Crises Delving Behind the Facade of
FinancialSector Reform and the Need for an InterdisciplinaryApproach, 28 THAMMASAT U. L.J. 246-76 (1998).
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The second element of a developing international consensus is the realization of the
importance of domestic financial stability for developing countries, especially given their
potential vulnerabilities to changes in capital flows within the international financial system.
In many ways, this emerging consensus is the result of the 1980s Debt Crisis and the
Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 and 1995, which has since been echoed in an all too substantial
form in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia, and Brazil." The consensus in this area
is that in order to develop economically, emerging market countries must have in place
appropriate structures to guarantee financial stability, especially given the increasing moreliance of emerging markets on that capital to fund
bility of international capital and the
34
their own development processes.
Public financial law is taking on an increasingly international overlay. Global consistency
in the prudential regulation of the similar financial services and activities of international
banks and securities firms can only be realized through enhanced initiatives in international
supervisory coordination and cooperative information-sharing arrangements." With respect to banking supervision, the Basle Committee has been the vehicle of international
regulatory cooperation for banking supervisors and the driving force behind coordinated
supervision for global markets. The Basle Committee has embraced the concepts of conthe home and host counsolidated supervision and clear division of responsibilities between
6
try supervisors for cross-border banking groups in this regard.1
With respect to securities regulation, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 37 has been the collective forum for the development of international
cooperation and information-sharing among securities regulators. Although IOSCO lacks
the supervisory influence enjoyed by the G-10 members of the Basle Committee, the geographically broader-based IOSCO membership has issued several (in 1986, 1989, 1994,
1996, and 1998 respectively) resolutions on compliance with basic IOSCO principles on
high regulatory standards, cooperation, and mutual assistance." These IOSCO initiatives
on international coordination and cooperative information-sharing have been carried out
largely on a bilateral basis between national securities regulators in the form of memoranda
of understanding (MoUs).39
Enhanced joint undertakings by the Basle Committee and IOSCO have had, and should
continue to have, a significant, positive influence on the international convergence, coor33. Cf. Arner, supra note 32.
34. See, interalia,Joseph J. Norton, InternationalCo-OperativeEfforts and Implicationsfor Law Reform, in BANK
FAILURES AND BANK INSOLVENCY LAW IN ECONOMIES IN

TRANSITION

(Rosa M. Lastra & Henry N. Schiffman

eds., 1999).
35. See Rosa M. Lastra, Developments in International Banking Regulatory Cooperation, in Y.B. INr'L FIN. &
ECON. L., 405-18 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 1998).
36. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Supervision of FinancialConglomerates(Feb. 1999), available
at <http://www.bis.org> [hereinafter Joint Forum]; see generally George A. Walker, The Law of FinancialConglomerates: The Next Generation, 30 INr'L LAW. 57 (1996).
37. IOSCO, established in 1983, has roughly over 120 voting, affiliate, and associate members, who are

primarily securities regulators, self-regulatory organizations, and related international organizations. The
IOSCO Technical Committee, composed of developed country members, and development committees, composed of members from countries with emerging markets, are the two principal committees through which
policies or recommendations are proposed.
38. IOSCO resolutions available at <http://www.iosco.org>.
39. For a list of IOSCO MoUs, see the IOSCO website at <http://www.iosco.org>. See also Hendrick
Jordaan, IOSCO's Contributionsto Mo Us with EmergingMarket Countries:An Analysis in Ligbt ofSEC Experiences,
2 Y.B. INT'L FIN &ECON. L. 339-67 (1999).

VOL. 33, NO. 4

A "NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE?"

901

dination, and information-sharing processes. The financial sector reform within developing,
emerging, and transitioning economies should reflect the continuing efforts of these two
informal international financial organizations.
The conclusion from analyses of both the recent Barings and Daiwa episodes, and the
various supervisory initiatives that followed, is that there needs to be improved coordination
and cooperation among banking supervisors and securities regulators. This coordination
may soon be achieved by a new panel of world financial regulators called the Joint Forum,
comprised of officials from the Basle Committee, IOSCO and the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (LAIS), that has agreed to convene, on a regular basis, to address
more definitively issues related to the supervision of international financial conglomerates.In sum, the degree of international regulatory coordination and cooperation is intensifying through the Basle Committee, IOSCO, JAIS, the Joint Forum, and the most recently
formed Financial Stability Forum-processes in response to the globalization of financial
markets. The international coordination and cooperative information-sharing initiatives
have been led primarily by supervisory authorities, and the private sector companies will
need to accommodate these initiatives while ensuring the preservation of confidential information given to the regulators. The supervisory initiatives have been bilateral, regional,
and broadly multilateral, and the geographic and institutional coverage has varied from
specific rules to broadly drawn recommendations. This process is encouraging and needs
to continue to develop.
2. The Global Principles
Based on the need to establish prescriptive requirements for the sort of safe and efficient
financial system that is essential for the functioning of any economy, the G-7 at their Lyon
Summit in 1996, in the wake of the Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994 and 1995, directed the
international financial institutions and organizations, especially the IMF, the World Bank,
and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, to develop standards for financial regulation to be implemented in both developed and developing countries, as well as to develop
41
solutions for domestic crises with international implications, such as the Mexican Crisis.
a. Banking Regulation
In the area of banking regulation and supervision, the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, composed of the G-10 central bank governors, developed Core Principlesfor
Effective Banking Supervision and Regulation.42 In the Core Principles, the Basle Committee,
in conjunction with regulators from sixteen other jurisdictions, including transition and
emerging economies, has produced twenty-five basic principles that should underlie the
banking supervisory policies and structures, present the basic outline for effective banking
supervision, and serve as a basic reference for supervisory and other public authorities in
all countries and internationally. Detailed guidance in the implementation of the CorePrinciples is in turn provided through the Basle Committee's compilation of its ongoing pro43
nouncements over the years.

40. See Joint Forum, supra note 36.
41. See Group of Ten, supra note 30, at 49.
42. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 31.
43. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Compendium of Documents Producedby the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision (Apr. 1997), available at <http://www.bis.org>.
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b. Capital Market Regulation
In the area of capital market regulation, IOSCO has taken the lead with its recent pub4
lication and adoption of Objectives and Principlesof SecuritiesRegulation. In addition, it has
45
developed a framework for minimum content of public offer prospectuses. Finally,
is in the
(LASC),
Committee
Standards
Accounting
IOSCO, along with the International
process of developing internationally acceptable accounting standards, with the hope of
uniting the international financial system with a single language. 6 These latter documents
are intended to set a basic framework for international offering documents that are acceptable to regulators and stock exchanges around the world.
c. Insurance Supervision
As with securities regulation, insurance supervision has historically not received the attention given to that of banking. With the growth of financial conglomerates and the consequent spread of potential systemic risks throughout the financial system, and with the
development of significant insurance company assets available for investment, insurance
regulation is an area of increased concern for regulators.
The IAIS has published Insurance Supervisory Principles to serve as guidelines for the
regulation and supervision of insurance markets and is in the process of developing guidelines or standards in the areas of licensing, use of derivatives, on-site inspections, solvency,
reinsurance, market conduct, and investment policies. 47 The IAIS has enunciated general
principles that identify subject areas that should be addressed in the laws of each4 jurisdiction,
with further guidance tailored specifically to the needs of emerging markets.
d. Corporate Governance
While the area of corporate governance has yet to produce a single set of international
principles, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) published
Sound Business Standards and CorporatePracticeson October 15, 1997, to help companies in
the region understand some of the broader concerns that lenders and investors have when
considering a potential loan or investment opportunity in the region. 49 These standards
delineate guidelines for businesses to consider in their dealings with customers, shareholders,
lenders, employees, suppliers, communities in which they operate, and government and local
authorities. Such relationships build upon the basic requirements for success of a company
having a sound strategy, competent management, valuable assets, and a promising market.
In addition, the G-7 has recently mandated the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) to develop a comprehensive set of corporate governance prin50
ciples to serve as the primary guidance in this area-a currently ongoing project.

44. IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Sept. 1998), available at <http://www.
iosco.org>.
45. IOSCO, InternationalDisclosure Standardsfor Cross-border Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers
(May 1998), available at <http://www.iosco.org>.
46. See IOSCO ANNUAL REPORT 1996. See also the IASC website at <http://www.iasc.org.uk>.

47. IAIS, Insurance Supervisory Principles (Basle: Sept. 1997).
48. IAIS, Guidance on Insurance Regulation and Supervision for Emerging Market Economies (Basle:
Sept. 1997).
49. EBRD, Sound Business Standards and Corporate Practices:A Set of Guidelines (Oct. 1997), available at
<http://www.ebrd.org>.
50. For details, see the OECD website at <http://www.oecd.org>.
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e. Financial Conglomerates
Financial conglomerates, now common throughout the world, present special concerns
due to their conjunction of banking, securities, and insurance activities and the differing
regulatory rationales for each. The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, in which the
Basle Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS participate, has now presented a framework for the
supervision of financial conglomerates and for the exchange of supervisory information,"
and the new Financial Stability Forum has been tasked with this issue of conglomerates.
f. Payment, Settlement, and Custody Mechanisms
Ineffective payment, settlement, and custody arrangements undermine the proper functioning of financial markets. In the area of payments and settlements, two organizations
have been active. The first, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, which
operates under the aegis of the G-10 central bank governors at the BIS, is seeking to develop
practices fostering efficient and viable payment and settlement systems.5 2 The second,
IOSCOs Emerging Markets Committee, in which regulators from sixty-four emerging
market countries participate, has released a report proposing the basis for the development
of a legal framework for clearance and settlement in emerging markets." The report highlights the main legal concerns that must be addressed in order to achieve an efficient clearance and settlement system for securities in emerging markets.
g. Pension Funds and Collective Investment Schemes
The regulation of international institutional investors, such as pension funds, is of increasing global significance. s 4 IOSCO has been the primary actor in developing standards
for the regulation of pension funds and collective investment schemes. In 1997, the IOSCO
Technical Committee published Principlesfor the Supervision of Operators of Collective Investment Schemes.5 IOSCO issued further guidance on the regulation and supervision of CIS
56
operators to address fundamental principles presented in the 1997 Report.
h. Accounting and Auditing Standards
In regard to international accounting standards, IOSCO and the IASC committed to the
development of international accounting standards for securities firms and companies by
July 1998. 5 IASC has now presented its completed program of forty standards for IOSCO's
consideration. This development will be of massive importance to all countries wishing to
participate in international capital markets. The development of such standards will mark
the creation of a truly international language of finance and investment, allowing direct
comparisons between investments in different markets."s

51. See Joint Forum, supra note 36.
52. For information on papers, see the BIS website at <http://www.bis.org>.
53. IOSCO, Towardsa Legal FrameworkforClearingand Settlement in Emerging Markets,Report ofthe Emerging
Markets Committee (Nov. 1997), available at <http://www.iosco.org>.
54. See Joseph J. Norton, Privatization of PublicPension Systems in Developing Nations: A Callfor International
Standards, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 817-66 (1999).
55. IOSCO, Ptinciplesfor the Regulation of Collective Investment Schemes, Report ofthe TechnicalCommittee (July
1995), available at <http://www.iosco.org>.
56. IOSCO Principlesfor the Supervision of Operators of Collective Investment Schemes, Report of the Technical
Committee (Sept. 1997).
57. See IOSCO, ANN. REP. 1996. See also the IASC website at <http://www.iasc.org.uk>.
58. See Marc Steinberg et al., The Development of InternationallyAcceptable Accounting Standards: A Universal
Languagefor Financein the 21st Century?, SMU L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999).
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CONVERGENCE AND IMPACT ON GLOBAL PUBLIC FINANCIAL LAW

International standard-setting is but one instrument of a broader process of financial
market and financial law convergence that is underway globally. The process of convergence
is also evolving through the concept of functional regulation (i.e., the provision of similar
regulatory and supervisory standards for similar activities that international banks and securities firms currently engage in on an increasingly cross-border basis). This concept, a
response to the rapidly changing financial marketplace, is guiding banking supervisors and
securities regulators to begin coordinating joint efforts in order to better understand the
banking and securities businesses, the corporate structures and attendant risks involved in
each business, and the increasing complexities of non-traditional cross-border activities.5 9
1. The New Global "Soft-Law-Making" Institutions
Within the banking and securities industries, much of the international consultation
among bank supervisors in recent years has been effectively handled through the Basle Committee. For capital market concerns, IOSCO has offered a similar international forum. 60 For
62
6
the insurance area, there is emerging the IAIS 1and for the accounting industry, the IASC.
What is even more significant is the growing cooperation among these various international
bodies as to international standards-setting. Of particular note is the work of theJoint Forum
on Financial Conglomerates. 6' In addition, as mentioned in Chairman Sheng's article in this
Symposium, a new coordinating body for Bank for International Settlements (BIS), IMF,
Basle Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, and the OECD has been formed to help assess the fragilities
of global markets, to oversee responses thereto, and otherwise to improve institutional coordination and exchange of information-i.e., the Financial Stability Forum.
The international convergence of minimum standards and perspectives of the Basle Committee and IOSCO has successfully produced a number of guiding principles in financial
market regulation. This has occurred in direct response to the increasing realization that
international banks and securities firms have the expertise and technological ability to engage in the full spectrum of financial activities and services anywhere in the world. Advances
in telecommunications and computer technology provide banks and securities firms with
new and more efficient opportunities to expand regionally, nationally, and globally in search
of new financial activities, markets, and profits. In this respect, the combined utilization of
human expertise and technological innovation is resulting in intense international competition. This competition directs such institutions to seek out non-traditional risks in each
respective business in pursuit of increased profits. Thus, the demarcation between banking
and securities industries is becoming forever blurred, perhaps to the point where fundamental distinctions will no longer exist in some operational areas. 4

59. Cf.Joseph J. Norton, Structuring the Banking Regulatorsand Supervisors: DevelopedCountry Experiencesand
theirPossible Implicationsfor Latin America and the Developing Countries,4 NAFTA: L. &Bus. REv. Am., Summer
1998, at 15-29.

60. For further information, see the IOSCO website at <http://wwn.iosoc.org>.
61. It is hoped that in the near future further information will be available at the Bank of International
Settlements website at <http://www.bis.org>, where IASC is now physically located.
62. Further information is available from the IASC website at <http://www.iasc.org>.
63. The three associations of bank, securities, and insurance supervisors collaborate through a "Joint Forum"
with respect to issues arising from the rise of international conglomerate financial institutions.
64. E.g., on recent U.S. experiences, see Joseph J. Norton, The Glass-SteagallActand Related Bank Legislative
Reform in the United States, 14 BANKING &FIN. L. REv. 11-42 (1998).
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2. Addressing Non-traditionalSystemic Risks
Public financial law also should take into account the new risks within the financial
system, as law can be a means for identifying and managing such risks. While financial
innovations have provided new opportunities to operate efficiently and to manage and
control risks, they also created the potential for financial institutions to accumulate enormous losses in a short period of time. The recent failure of Barings Bank due to rapidly
accumulated trading losses in exchange-traded derivatives is one most notable example of
such intragroup contagion.6 5 In addition, these innovations may increase the possibility for
non-traditional systemic risks that should be addressed jointly by financial institutions and
regulators. These non-traditional systemic risks arise because enhanced linkages across national and international financial markets increase the volatility of capital flows and the
potential for concentrated disturbances to be transmitted more broadly across institutional
groups or markets. The increased linkages across markets and volatility in capital flows may
precipitate or trigger rapid intermarket contagion, and thus, systemic difficulties. The international ramifications from the Mexican liquidity crisis beginning in December 1994
and lasting through February 1995, and the more recent East Asian Financial Crises of
66
1997 and 1998, are glaring illustrations of this phenomenon.
There are four principal non-traditional areas of potential systemic risk present in the
international financial system today that need to be addressed by bank regulators. Though
the full analysis of these risks is outside the scope of this section, it is useful to address each
in turn. These risks can only be addressed appropriately by financial institutions and international regulators working together in quasi-symbiotic partnerships.
First, there is the threat that a second sovereign debt crisis will arise because of developing
country default on securitized debt obligations. These concerns are exacerbated by the
widely dispersed holdings of these obligations among institutional investors and by the fact
that the terms and conditions on instruments such as Brady Bonds are not conducive to
6
sovereign debt reschedulings or restructurings.
Second, there is the dramatically increased exposure to foreign exchange payment and
settlement risk, otherwise known as Herstatt Risk, underlined by the BIS in its March 1996
report.6 The fact that the multi-currency clearing systems currently in existence are not
subject to regulatory oversight intensifies concerns of such risks.
Third, there is the potentially destabilizing effect of money laundering by criminal syndicates on the international financial system. Money laundering contagion could arise as a
systemic risk if financial institutions or financial communities, such as those in certain Latin
American countries, Russia and Eastern Europe, or in China, are overcome with criminal

65. For a more detailed analysis of the failure of Barings plc and its ramifications on international regulatory
convergence, see Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Globalization of FinancialRisks andInternational
Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons From the Barings Debacle, 30 INT'L LAw. 305, 305-23 (1996).
66. See Joseph J. Norton, The Mexican Peso Crisis and the Future of Financial Integration in the Americas,
ch. 12, in The ChangingWorld of InternationalLaw in the Twenty-First Century: A Tribute to the Late Kenneth R.
Simmonds (Joseph J. Norton et al., eds. 1998).
67. See, inter alia, Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implicationsfor
Future Restructurings,64 FoRoDHM L. REv. 2701 (1996).

68. See Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions,Bank for InternationalSettlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) (Mar. 1996).
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influence and saturated with laundered funds. In short, the interests of international criminal syndicates may not exactly promote the preservation of the stability of the international
financial system. If the influence of these groups permeates financial institutions or communities, any aspect of the international financial system could be at risk if financial obli69
gations are ignored or institutions and governments become corrupted.
Fourth, there is non-sovereign-related "cross-border financial crises contagion risk," as
most recently evidenced by the East Asian Financial Crises. Addressing this fundamental
problem, it has become clear that the new financial architecture will need to be heavily lawbased.10
Notwithstanding these potential systemic risks, continued legislative or regulatory attempts to maintain segmented regulation between international banks and securities firms
will only serve to shift activities to more favorable jurisdictions within the global financial
community. In effect, the process of international regulatory convergence in banking supervision and securities regulation is not an attempt to restrict expansion into new activities
or competition among financial institutions. Rather, the process is being driven internationally so that regulators may catch up with modern international financial market developments, which are coming about with an almost unnerving speed as a result of the
accelerated rate of technological innovation. 7
Thus, technologically driven market reforms are precipitating revolutionary changes
within the banking and securities industries on an international basis. In turn, changes in
the methods by which international financial institutions should be supervised and/or regulated are being engendered. These changes are already happening to some degree on the
international spectrum. This technological dimension is also something of key importance
that will have to be factored into any future efforts in addressing economic and financial
law crises.72
The process of international convergence, however, has occurred, up to now, largely in
a piecemeal and disorganized manner. Nonetheless, the convergence process assuredly
marks the transition from fragmented, nationally-based regulatory arrangements in the
banking and securities industries towards a system of international principles and standards.
These principles will be applied in a functionally integrated global financial services industry
that will encompass both banking and securities businesses, and will have to be assimilated
into any rethinking of public financial law-perhaps as a species or subset of economic law.

IV. Thematic Strands to the New Global Financial Law
A number of thematic strands underlie the developing framework of the new global public
financial law: "coherence," "sequencing," "evaluation," "interconnection," "accountingstan-

69. Cf., generally, BANKS: FRAUD ANOCRIME fGosephJ. Norton & Gerald N. Olson eds., 2d. ed. forthcoming
2000).
70. See generally Group of Twenty-Two Systemically Significant Countries, Reports on the International
Financial Architecture (Oct. 1998).
71. See CROss-BORDER ELECTRONIC BANKING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (JosephJ. Norton & Chris
Reed eds., 1994).
72. See Jane K. Winn, The Impact of the Internet on U.S. Regulation of SecuritiesMarkets, 2 Y.B. INT'L FIN. &
ECON. L. 409-24 (1999).
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dards as quasi-legal rules," "transparency," "governance and the Rule of Law," "ongoing

fight against corruption and global financial criminality," and "a viable legal infrastructure."17
A. COHERENCE

According to many writers, a country may not need to adopt one total system, but often
should pick and choose, as it appears to be best in defined situations. Such an amalgam,
however, should be a mosaic, which implies coordination and coherence. Uncoordinated,
piecemeal adaptations may, in the long-term, be counterproductive.
It is within the timeframe where exchange controls are to be eliminated and the system
fully opened to the international financial system that crises seem most common and potentially damaging. While nations around the world are at different stages of capital liberalization, these issues are of much significance, given the recent experiences in developing
and transition countries worldwide. For these reasons, it is important that reform and liberalization are not done in piecemeal fashion, but according to a broader picture of the
eventual goal. It is in this respect that the need for careful analysis of any potential underlying problems remaining must be done and these problems attended to before they are
exposed to the waves of the international financial system.
B. SEQUENCING

The European Union model is based on this concept. However, sequencing is not a
mechanical process, but should be customized and fine-tuned on a country-by-country
basis. The need is to approach law reform from a made-to-order and not from a readymade perspective. As has been demonstrated, improper sequencing (i.e., liberalization preceding strengthening) of financial reforms has been a critical underlying factor in many
financial crises. In light of the need for coherence, proper sequencing must also be carefully
structured. This is especially true in the case of financial harmonization and liberalization.
C. EVALUATION
Clearly, economic law reform efforts to date have been largely unscientific processes,
with little or no built-in procedures to ensure accountability, monitoring and reevaluation.

The need for appropriate and ongoing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is perhaps
the ultimate challenge for IFOs, IFIs and concerned emerging economies. As can be seen,
temporary success is not sufficient evaluation. Domestic efforts must focus on determining

potential problems before they are exposed by the market and treating them decisively and
effectively. As noted before, small- and medium-sized, open economies do not have the
luxuries that large economies do in this respect.
D. INTERCONNECTION
Today, various areas of law reform are inextricably interconnected, e.g., banking with
securities law reform. The need for interconnection of related and interlinked areas of law
reform cannot be understated, although it is sometimes neglected, even in the developed
world. Once again, underlying problems such as those described in the context of corporate

73. Portions of this section have been derived from recent articles by the author on financial sector law
reform in London at the University of London and in Hamburg at the Max Planck Institute. See,e.g., Norton,
supra
note 34.
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seemingly unrelated, and pogovernance need to be addressed before they impact some
74
tentially economically significant, variable or vulnerability.
With these thoughts in mind, individual nations may need to adopt solutions corresponding to their different levels of development and their different needs, especially in relation
to the financial sector; however, this must be done carefully, thoughtfully, and rationallynot simply at the behest of foreign investors or the IMF or even out of desire to appease
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
E. AccoUNTING

STANDARDS AS QUAsi-LEGAL RULES

Accounting standards clarify relationships and encourage investment, both domestic and
foreign, because they provide an understandable common language for businessmen to
communicate about their businesses and finances.7" In addition, internationally accepted
accounting standards encourage investment because they provide transparency and comprehensibility. For these reasons, consistent accounting standards are absolutely essential
for the success of continued financial stability and development in any emerging market
economy. With the accounting profession applying internationally accepted accounting
standards that should not be compromised, companies will gain greater experience and
confidence with accounting systems and practices, thereby increasing their own role in the
international financial system. Perhaps more importantly, business people in emerging markets will find that clear systems of accounting are not only good for encouraging foreign
investment, but also for their own internal management purposes and maintenance of profitability in the long-term.
Consistent accounting standards are absolutely essential for the success of enterprise
reform in any country. Accounting standards clarify relationships and encourage investment, both domestic and foreign. Further, accounting standards are the basis of the operational fiction that in many cases allows financial institutions to continue to exist in the face
of probable technical insolvency. While accounting standards must eventually be internationalized in order to provide transparency for both domestic and international investors,
this process can be gradual as internal problems are eliminated, currencies move towards
convertibility, and markets open to international capital. For that reason, all countries,
including the United States, would do well to consider the developments in this area and
to work to use and facilitate the use of such international standards.
In particular, a country's ongoing involvement in the IASC and assimilation of its efforts
should be encouraged. Also, the role of regulatory authorities in fostering and in shaping
appropriate accounting rules and practices for domestic financial and business institutions
should not be underestimated.
F.

TRANSPARENCY

Transparency is necessary so that all the various players understand the rules of the game,
and the game can continue successfully. 76 As the recent experiences of Thailand, South
74. Some suggest that this may be a problem in South Africa. See Jabulani Sikhalthane, Open Season: Some
Are More Equal Than Others, FIN. MAIL, Apr. 10, 1998, at 42.
75. See, e.g., D. Mercado, Evolving Accounting Standardsin the InternationalMarkets, Practicing Law Institute,
Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. B4-7166 (Oct. 1996).
76. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Essay: FinancialTransparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What

You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335 (June 1996) (discussing the importance of transparency in the U.S.
financial system).
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Korea, and Japan have shown, legal and financial transparency are of utmost importance in
the long-term successful development of an effective financial system." The emerging international consensus on the requirements for financial stability is built on the principle of
transparency, and for this reason, the financial and legal infrastructure of any emerging
market must be transparent. Moreover, the advantages of transparency are a baseline for
financial and legal development, and resulting financial stability and economic success.
Transparency is necessary not only for international investors, but also for domestic investors. Transparency is necessary to whatever solution a government chooses to resolve
banking problems, because without it, investors, companies, banks, and markets will not
understand and will not have confidence in the process chosen. It is necessary in accounting
so that investors can determine values for productive and non-productive assets and make
decisions accordingly. It is necessary for banks in order to lengthen loan horizons and
evaluate borrowing and lending decisions. It also is necessary for capital markets in order
for investors to understand the nature and risks of investing in securities and thereby prevent
the potentially disastrous rise and collapse of stock market bubbles. Furthermore, it is necessary for international investors to make comparisons and to make secure and well-

thought-out business decisions, which will benefit not only themselves, but also companies
making choices that encourage investment and eventual success in the market.
Both the Mexican and the East Asian crises were triggered and exacerbated partly when
investors found out that reserves were smaller than they had thought and that short-term
debt was higher."8 One of the many lessons drawn from Mexico and East Asia is that the
extent of the crisis was worsened by the poor quality of information supplied to both the
official sector, including the IMF, and the markets-and perhaps even by well-meaning
government suppression or distortions of critical information in the hope of buying more
time for the reform processes to set in. The East Asian crises reinforce the argument for
better and more timely provision of information, including information on central bank
forward operations.
There are two arguments in this regard: (i) better informed markets are likely to make
better decisions, and in both Mexico and Asia, this would have meant that markets withdrew
funds sooner than they did, thereby hastening adjustment; and (ii) the obligation to publish
information on certain interventions would affect the extent and nature of those interventions, helping to prevent some unwise decisions. In this regard, at the moment, the IMF is
only seeking to further strengthen its Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS); however, it is quite possible that stronger measures are forthcoming.
According to Alan Greenspan, the primary protection from adverse financial disturbances
is effective counterparty surveillance and hence, government regulation and supervision
should seek to produce an environment in which counterparties can most effectively oversee
the credit risks of potential transactions.7 9 In this respect, a major improvement in transparency, including both accounting and public disclosure, is essential. However, given the
financial crises earlier in the decade in Norway, Sweden, and Finland-countries with
highly transparent economic systems and advanced institutional frameworks-more transparency is probably not sufficient in and of itself8 0 Yet in this author's view, the long-term
77. See, e.g., Sandra Sugawara, Market Troubles Felt Farand Wide, INT'L HER. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1997, at 1.
78. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Boats, Planesand Capital Flows, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at 32.
79. See Implications ofAsian FinancialCrisis,supra note 2.
80. See Stiglitz, supra note 7. It may be argued, however, that in the context of these countries, problems
were exacerbated by the existence of implicit government guarantees and explicit currency pegs similar to those
that finally in fact led to the crises in Asia and Mexico.
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benefits of enhanced disclosure and surveillance need to come, principally on a regional or
sub-regional and on a per country basis, with closer communications exchanges with reputable private, local market analysts, and not from undue reliance on the surveillance mechanism of the international monetary and financial institutes.
G.

GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF

LAW

The emerging international consensus is that a transparent, predictable, and enforceable
legal regime underlies successful economic development.8' It is important for investors and
businesses to feel that their investments are safe and can be protected in order to provide
the necessary confidence in the financial system.
The "Rule of Law" as to economic or other societal regulation is of little practical value
unless fair and effective enforcement can be attained and sustained. As such, regulatory
authorities require adequate personnel and technological capabilities to ensure effective enforcement. The enforcement must also befair, both substantively and procedurally; this will
require transparent and judicially reviewable administrative processes. Also, administrative
enforcement cannot be entirely fair and effective without an independent, well-educated,
and non-corrupt judiciary.
H.

ONGOING FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND GLOBAL CRIMINALITY

Corruption can undermine the reform process by reducing public confidence.2 As corruption increases, confidence in the fairness and openness of the financial system decreases,
causing investment to decrease and move to other shores. While corruption in some countries such as China, Russia, and certain countries of Latin America is of international concern, it nonetheless must always be a concern in any country. From the standpoint ofgeneral
financial stability, if corruption is too pervasive, confidence in the financial system will
weaken and investment and stability will decrease. From the standpoint of banking, if corruption palpably exists, banks may be weakened by insider lending practices, such as has
been the case in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea-these are the moral hazard problems
discussed earlier and commonly referred to as "crony capitalism." Finally, from the standpoint of capital markets, corruption can cause wariness to invest due to perceptions of a
"rigged" market or can in fact shake confidence to such an extent that the market collapses.
Corruption in fact can be seen as the primary cause of the collapse of the UK stock market
at the time of the South Sea Bubble in the early 1700s.13
Corruption, however, does not necessarily equate with the absolute requirement of arm's
length business transactions. In some cultures, such a solution is obviously impossible; however, a few requirements are probably in order: maximum lending limits to a single borrower
in line with international standards, prohibition and punishment of market manipulation,
and the punishment of self-dealing, perhaps through the development of corporate fiduciary

81. See Group of Ten, supra note 30.
82. For detailed information on the impact of corruption and international efforts to combat it, see the
homepage of Transparency International, an organization formed to monitor and encourage international
efforts against corruption, at Transparency International (last modified June 21, 1999) <http://www.
transparency.de>.
83. See generallyJOHNCARSWELL, THE SouTH SeA BUBBLE(1960).
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duties. Obviously, such requirements protect ownership interests, as well as enhance general
confidence in the financial system, and should be strongly implemented.
Given the historical situation and the strong domestic perceptions of corruption and
"crony capitalism" in many developing and transition countries, efforts in this respect are
of great significance.84 Most importantly, these problems undermine domestic confidence
in capital markets, the financial system, the judicial system, and individual perceptions of
potential for development and success. Efforts to update laws on monopolies and insider
lending and dealing, along with appropriate enforcement of these sorts of provisions, would
help to reduce perceptions of a rigged financial and judicial system and increase domestic,
as well as international, participation.
In this latter context, recent efforts of regulatory authorities to emphasize enforcement
needs in most of the countries worst affected by recent crises are to be applauded. Certainly
these financial regulators need to be in a period of consolidation, revaluation, monitoring,
and enforcement. Enforcement practices need to be fair, open, rule-based, reviewable, and
balanced; however, overly aggressive enforcement should not be used as a substitute for
effective government supervisory practices, as this could lead to an unwarranted "chill" on
legitimate business and financial activities (e.g., as occurred in the United States during the
1989 to 1992 period).
Related to the need to crack down on corruption is the ongoing fight against using
financial institutions for illicit, money laundering purposes. This problem goes to the core
of the integrity of financial institutions and their management and touches such institutions
and financial systems in both emerging and developed countries."
I. VIABLE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Based on experiences gained in recent international financial crises and the extensive
literature on the topic, one can identify core areas of the legal infrastructure that are necessary for the development of functioning decentralized financial markets and the creation
of a sound business environment. While it is also a priority for countries in the region to
develop stable macroeconomic frameworks and policies, these policies must be strengthened and supported by the development of an environment of effective laws and institutions.
Indeed, in the context of potentially very lucrative investments, e.g., in the energy sector,
be as, if not more, important than the
the legal and institutional environment can in fact
86
existence of a stable macroeconomic framework.
While the following list is by no means exhaustive, these core areas are of great importance and, when combined with an appropriate second level of financial regulation and
supervision, which was discussed in the previous section, create the necessary environment
for the development of viable financial markets:
- Clear and defined property rights. The creation of property rights is of course a cornerstone of the development and transition process. In many ways, without the creation
of property rights, development or transition is not possible.

84. See, e.g., Traisorat, supra note 5.
FRAUD ANDCRIME, supra note 69; and Cologne Report, supranote 3, paras. 28 and 29.
85. See, interalia, BANKS:
86. See discussion in Norton, supra note 34; see also KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF
LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1960-1995 (1998).
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" A regime supporting binding and enforceable contracts. Investment is predicated on
binding and enforceable contracts, without which parties cannot effectively structure
their transactions.
" Adequate company law incorporating principles of good corporate governance. Prospective investors, both domestic and foreign, need to be assured that the legislative
and contractual frameworks within which corporate entities operate provide adequate
protection of their legitimate interests and expectations. The importance of effective
corporate governance has been underlined by the G-10 and recent international financial crises. In addition, its impact can be seen directly in the context of investors' decisions not to invest in companies, and sometimes even countries, that are viewed as
problematic in this respect.
" Adequate lending infrastructure, including secured transactions law. The role of an
adequate lending infrastructure is at the heart of recent problems in East Asia and
Mexico. A proper legal framework for lending encourages extended loan duration and
improved currency matches and enhances the development of domestic financial markets.
" Clear rules governing foreign investment and public-private partnerships (concession
law). Without clear rules on foreign investment, foreign capital will not enter a market.
Clear rules discourage corruption and enhance respect for the Rule of Law as well as
aiding in the transfer of funds and technology necessary to transition and development.
Public-private partnership arrangements require a legal infrastructure that recognizes
the legitimate needs and expectations of the parties.
" Effective bankruptcy provisions, including for financial institutions. Once again, East
Asia has underlined the significance of bankruptcy procedures, not only for economic
renewal, but also for adequate protection of investor rights in the context of a business
failure.
" Fair and reasonably predictable tax laws. Fair and reasonably predictable tax laws are
an absolute necessity both for the adequate functioning of domestic governments and
for the encouragement of investment and growth. The negative impact of Russia's
unclear and ineffective tax system on financial development is generally recognized.
While no international consensus has evolved in respect of underlying legal infrastructure, the concentration of bilateral and multilateral legal assistance in these core areas illustrates consensus around the critical role these core areas play in transition and economic
development.
V. The Unfinished Agenda
Unfortunately, despite best efforts, the domestic, regional, and international authorities
do not seem as yet able to present any comprehensive solution to the problems of financial
law reform in emerging markets. While the emerging international consensus is very important and useful in terms of general standard-setting and detailing of policy options, no
one choice is always appropriate, but rather should be tailored individually in each case. In
this regard, it is obviously important to emerging economies to look to learn any lessons
that it can from the experiences of Mexico and its other East Asian neighbors in order not
only to avoid these sorts of crises occurring again, but also to enhance its own national path
of sustainable development.
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LINGERING PROBLEMS

Looking specifically at the overall problems likely to continue to affect the financial
systems in many emerging markets for the near future, the following come to mind: the
weakness of banking institutions, the prevalence of corruption and "crony capitalism," the
lack of effective and consistent regulatory enforcement, the lack of sophisticated and efficient judicial mechanisms for the resolution of financial disputes, the inexperience of market
participants, and the shortage of domestic savings.
At a more fundamental level, the inefficiencies of general corporate law and of investment
firm regulation, and in particular the absence of appropriate solutions to questions of conflicts of interests and insider dominance in corporate governance and securities activities,
are likely to impede the smooth and rapid maturation of financial systems. While the financial systems of the affected East Asian economies are maturing, these sorts of problems
are likely to be of major importance in the near future, given these countries' need to
develop confidence and broaden participation in its financial system and the range of financial instruments (including suitable debt and derivative products).
These are all problems without easy, quick, or necessarily direct solutions. In the final
analysis, however, maybe one can agree on a few points. First, the international standardsetting process is encouraging in that in the past little attention was paid directly to this
very important issue and little was done directly to address these fundamental problems.
Second, the role of the intergovernmental organizations, whether on a worldwide, regional,
or subregional level, and of internationally oriented domestic institutions in weaving together the strands for sustainable financial and economic development in transitioning and
emerging economies, cannot be underestimated, yet they cannot be overestimated. This
role can be viewed as largely directive, in a general sense, and supportive of a particular
country's national commitment to true market, legal, political, and social reform.

B.

SHORT-TERM CAPITAL

FLOWS

Some are now arguing that short-term capital flows such as those that triggered the recent
financial crises in Mexico and East Asia do not bring ancillary benefits, but instead only
increase the vulnerability of an economy, especially in situations such as East Asia where
high domestic savings rates existed and resulted in misallocation of marginal investment.87
Even the editors of the FinancialTimes (London) agree that the case for early and complete
freedom for international capital flows has been damaged and that the question is how to
maximize the benefits of capital flows to developing countries, while minimizing both the
number of panics and the damage they cause." The question, and it is a complex one that
no one knows the answer to, is how to do this. Joseph Stiglitz, Senior Vice President and
Chief Economist of the World Bank, first suggests that at the domestic level, tax, regulatory,
and policy distortions that may have stimulated such flows and encouraged short-term
foreign borrowing, such as the Bangkok International Banking Facilities, need to be eliminated. Second, capital inflow inhibitions, such as those in Chile (essentially a tax on short-

87. See Stiglitz, supra note 78.
88. Regulating CapitalFlows, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at 33; see also P.B. Rana, Surges and Volatility of
Private Capital Flows to Asian Developing Countries: Implications for Multi-lateral Development Banks; IMF

Occasional Paper No. 19 (Dec. 1998).
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maturity loans), may be appropriate. The suggestion being that these, together with solid
fundamentals and a sound financial system, may be the reason that Chile has been relatively
unaffected by recent crises. In the future, however, because the East Asian and other emerging economies will continue to need international capital for development, it would do well
to focus on mechanisms such as lending infrastructure and domestic currency markets to
encourage longer-term, domestic currency lending, while at the same time increasing and
protecting its international reserves.
C. REGIONAL RESPONSES TO FINANCIAL CRISES

In terms of East Asia we are not speaking of only domestic reform, but about developing
realistic, viable, and workable mechanisms for pursuing this reform process on an appropriate regional or subregional basis.
The globalization of financial markets has increased the complexity of the international
financial system and the volume and size of international capital flows. These complexities
present new challenges and opportunities to international trade arrangements, law reform,
and economic development. In the 1996 Lyon Summit Economic Communiqui the G-7
nations asserted that, in calling for the strengthening of economic and monetary cooperation, their respective economic policies would continue to be coordinated towards sustaining non-inflationary growth and that its finance ministers would continue to cooperate
closely on economic policy and in the foreign exchange markets.9 The G-7 declared that
strong and mutually beneficial growth in trade and investment "will be sustainable and
therefore most beneficial to all if conducted within a strong multilateral framework of
rules," thus reaffirming the central role of the WTO and the preeminence of multilateral
rules to serve as the framework for regional initiatives 0
The recent crises have highlighted the potential role of regional organizations. Because
of the different levels of development and openness to the international financial system in
the region, it is extremely important to take into account in the drafting process the tension
between liberalization, safety and soundness and the potential for financial crises discussed
earlier.
In addition to global standards and risk protection, a complementary regional response
is also warranted, primarily because contagion effects have tended to be strongest within
the region of the country immediately affected. Further, regional and subregional neighbors
may be better poised both for cost-effective surveillance and for effective peer monitoring.
Possible mechanisms include funding, surveillance, and technical cooperation.
Beyond the high-profile efforts of the European Union, other regional organizations are
beginning to venture into the financial sphere. Of most recent note, of course, are the
initiatives being taken in Southeast Asia, through the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN). Beyond Southeast Asia, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and Mercosur are both increasingly influential in the sphere of financial regulation and supervision within their respective member countries, and should become even
more so if the preliminary international work currently underway following the April 1998
Second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, is any indication of the future.

89. See, e.g., Making a Success of Globalizationfor the Benefit ofAll, in ECONOMIC COMMUNIQUi (G-7 Summit,
Lyon, France) Gune 28, 1996), reprintedin 13 BNA Iwr'L TRADE REP. no. 27, at 70 (1996).
90. Id.
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In looking at regional integration, a "bottom-up," "building block" strategy also is perhaps best. Under this approach, the first stage is focused on laying an appropriate foundation
in the form of an effective institutional framework for the financial system in each country,
including an independent central bank and private institutions and markets. Following this
initial program, by no means an insignificant accomplishment, the goal is to look at issues
of market access and potential harmonization and integration. If a similar coherent and
sequenced approach had been followed in respect to East Asia's entry into the international
financial system, the crises there might have been avoided.
It should be noted, however, that the East Asian and other emerging economy countries
face numerous challenges in addressing these sorts of integration issues. The region's
nations span a wide range of economic, political, and social development. For that reason,
a political choice to focus first on cooperation, then coordination, followed by possible
eventual harmonization may be a wise and pragmatic one indeed. Not only does such a
"road map" reflect the realpolitickof differences in development and sensitivities to sovereign
"pressure points," it also reflects the real underlying needs of the constituent nations: development, not political integration. These efforts can be further complicated by the exis-

tence of IMF and other self-imposed structural adjustment programs in numerous nations
throughout the region. These pre-existing requirements must be taken into account and
internalized within any integration process.
In all of these things, however, the role of law and the threat of law-based failures creating

potentially self-fulfilling vulnerabilities cannot be ignored. As such, legal efforts must be
aimed first at preventive and developmental measures in the immediate time frame, with
harmonization and integration as secondary goals over a longer horizon.
D.

REFORM OF THE

IFIs

For well over two decades, the traditional IFIs (i.e., the IMF, the World Bank, and the
Regional Development Banks) have been struggling to identify and redefine their core
missions. Institutionally, these organizations have been adrift, reacting more to the rapidly
changing, and often volatile and unpredicted, economic, financial, monetary, technological,
and political environment(s) impacting our global society. Severe criticism and suggestions
for reform, and even for elimination or consolidation, of various organizations have been
9
awash in recent years. '
What tends to be forgotten is the historical significance and bureaucratic composition
of these IFIs. Each was a key part of a supplement to the ingenious and largely successful
Bretton Woods System that brought the Western World economies back on their feet and
set a foundation for broader economic development within the Third World. In reality, the
broad goals remain the same: (i) promotion of an efficient international training system,
(ii) assurance of a stable international monetary and financial sphere, and (iii) allowance of
9
an "equitable, socially acceptable distribution of income and wealth." The economic, political, and funding environment within which these institutions operate today, however,
93
are fuidamentally different from those of the 1950s and 1960s.

91. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Power unto Self FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 21.
92. Alexander Swoboda, Reforming the InternationalFinancialArchitecture,35 FiN. & DEV., No. 3 (1999).
93. Cf.Martin S. Feldstein, Refocusing theIMF, 77 FOREIGN AFF., No. 2, at 20 (1998).
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Further, the historical bureaucratic composition and focus of these institutions reflect
inherent limitations on expanding or substantially changing functions of the IFIs. For example, the IMF has traditionally focused on macroeconomic issues affecting monetary arrangements and stability. Now they are being asked to take on responsibilities for financial
sector and corporate structural reforms in emerging and developing economies, for technical assistance on these various microeconomic issues, for financial crisis prevention, and
for monitoring (i.e., through surveillance) the global financial environment. Based upon
expertise, adequate staffing, and budgetary capacity, the IMF is simply not well-suited or
prepared, at the moment, for the enormous tasks that are being thrust upon it.94
Certainly, the set of principles that the Cologne Report proposes as a guide for strengthening and reforming the IFIs are desirable but are incomplete: for instance, increasing
transparency within and collaboration among the IMF and World Bank and its constitutional member countries, effecting internal institutional reform such as transforming the
IMF's Interim Committee into a permanent council, and fostering economic development
in the Third World on economically productive, yet socially and equitably acceptable bases.
The dilemma, however, is that the nature, scope, and dynamics of the international trading
system, of our international monetary financial environment, of the fragmented developmental dynamics of the Third World concluding emerging and transitioning economies,
and of our dramatically reconfigured global political environment have made it virtually
impossible for the IFIs to arrive at a clear, longer-term, and meaningful review of their
respective organizational missions. 95
In addition, it needs to be kept in mind that the IFIs are essentially international bureaucracies comprised mainly of well-trained technocrats, who are primarily economists.
As such, these institutions are, to a large extent, transmitters or implementors of the changing, and at times conflicting, objectives of their key member states and are subject to increasing restrictive budgetary constraints to the extent their budgets may depend on member state funding. Though designed as largely depoliticized institutions, in times of major
crises and global uncertainty, the institutions appear to be influenced substantially, albeit
indirectly, by the prevailing political and economic views of their key member states. The
recent Mexican, East Asian, and Russian financial crises and the dominating influence of
the U.S. Treasury are cases in point. Revamping available financing facilities, increasing
technical assistance, and enhancing institutional surveillance functions of IFIs and Regional
Development Banks cannot be argued against. Yet, no major government seems to wish a
general and collective rethinking of these institutions' roles. Until this happens, the IFI's
role will be largely ad hoc and reactive, with prospects for the long-term institutional success
severely limited. 96
E.

INTERACTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

THE

WTO/GATS

OF PUBLIC:

FINANCIAL LAW AND PROCESS

Countries, both developed and otherwise, must consider the implications of financial

94. See generally D. Folkerts-Landau & Garber, The New FinancialArchitecture: A Threat to the Markets?,
Deutsche Bank (Apr. 1999).
95. See Cologne Report, supra note 3, paras. 10-15.
96. Cf. Karen Lessakers, The IMF and the Asian Crises-A View from the Executive Board, Presentation
Made at University of London (May 1999).
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crises on the efforts of the WT0 97 and, more directly, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and its component negotiations on financial services concluded on December 12, 1997. 91 In the present extensive debate taking place regarding the role of the
"architecture of the international financial system" 99 in both preventing and responding to
financial crises, one component that is not addressed is the interplay of the Bretton Woods
institutions (the IMF and World Bank Group) with their long-lost sister, the WTO.
In developing financial stability and the requisite legal infrastructure, four issues seem to
be paramount: (i) a robust financial system, including an independent central bank;'(ii) corporate governance and the creation of an effective incentive and monitoring structure
for corporate performance; ""1 (iii) a strengthening and expansion of domestic capital markets; 1° 2 and (iv) the need for an effective insolvency regime combined with the creation of
a suitable social safety net in order to resolve business and financial institution failures and
to prevent political and social instability.' °3 These must all be undertaken and largely successful prior to full integration with the international financial system. Although not a
predicate to trade liberalization, such development underpins the growth of successful trade
finance, which is necessary for trade growth. Defining this nexus between trade liberalization and "safety and soundness" concerns for financial markets and institutions becomes
a major, cooperative challenge for trade and financial services officials and financial authorities, on the multilateral, regional and domestic levels."- 4
The new requirements of international financial law need to be increasingly taken into
account in the processes of traditional international economic law such as the WTO. At
present, the road forward is not clear, but as implementation and expansion of the membership of the GATS and the financial services protocol' 1 continues to attempt to further
liberalize trade in financial services worldwide, countries must necessarily address their own
domestic financial system weaknesses as a precursor to increased openness.
F.

AN EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The unfolding of the NIFA indicates a more coordinated study of banking and securities
and other relevant areas of financial law: the broad umbrella is really one of financial in97. Seegenerally JOHN HOWARD JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURIS(1998); idem., WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE) (1969).
PRUDENCE

98. For details, content and signatories, see the WTO website at <http://www.wto.org>.
99. See,
e.g.,Camdessus, supra note 3.
100. See generally ROSA MARIE LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING REGULATION (1996). See also, inter
alia, E.P. DAVIS, DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK (1992); and Patrick Honohan, Banking System
Failuresin Developingand TransitionCountries: Diagnosisand Predictions, 1997 BIS WORKING PAPER
no. 39 (1997).
101. For development of this thesis in the context of the United States, see MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). Also, generally note the re-

cent OECD project on corporate governance, at OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (last modified
June 22, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/govemance/principles.htm>.
102. See IMF, supra note 8. This well might include also the development of securitized instruments. See B.
Barbour, J. Norton & T. Slover, Securitization in Emerging Markets, in 2 Y.B. INT'L FIN. L. 1997 281-316
(1999).
103. For a helpful compilation concerning legal and economic issues of international and comparative insolvency, see

JAGDEEP

S. BHANDARI & LEONARD W.

WEISS, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL

PERSPECTIVES (1996).

104. Cf. Jackson, supra note 26. Mary E. Footer, GA7T and Foreign Banking as a Trade in Services, ch. 2, in
INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (JosephJ. Norton et al. eds.,

1994).
105. VTO, Fifth Protocol to the GeneralAgreement on Trade in Services, S/L/45 (Dec. 3, 1997).
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stitutions, financial markets, financial institution and market law, and financial law. In addition, such study will require a comparative law understanding of financial law systems
and of other countries, and an international understanding of the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, the IOSCO and other IFI processes will be required. While much of
the subject matter will remain the realm of domestic law or international soft-law, the
subject matter as a whole should become an increasingly important dimension for the teaching of international economic law.
A most significant component of financial law in the twenty-first century, whether in
Asia, Africa, the Western Hemisphere, or the Wider Europe, will involve, necessarily, an
interdisciplinary and international conceptualization of how regulatory and marketplace
forces can interconnect compatibly to provide an appropriate legal environment for the
eventual melding of a new working partnership among the various financial institution regulators themselves and then among these combined and cooperating regulators, the financial institution industries and the major international financial institutions.
In this context, traditional public lawyers need to come to terms with the increasing
reality that economic regulation is becoming a significant part of public law: simply, because
it is financial regulation does not make it any less public law.S6 It is not proposed that the
traditional relevance of private law aspects of financial law (e.g., regarding the bankcustomer relationship and financial instruments) will no longer be important. To the contrary, private financial and commercial law aspects should be of increasing educational and
practical importance. What is suggested, however, is that the private law dimension will
have to be evaluated in the overall context of an expanding, interconnecting, and
converging-nationally, regionally, and internationally-regulatory framework for finan10 7
cial institutions and financial services.
As such, the need to foster further financial stability and to maintain international supervisory and regulatory standards will be even greater. To this end, a greater academic,
administrative, and judicial understanding and appreciation of the increasing international
regulatory dimensions of financial law will be required. Also, one will need to study carefully
the implications of how WTO liberalization of financial services will accommodate legitimate prudential supervisory concerns. Defining this nexus between trade liberalization and
"safety and soundness" concerns for financial markets and institutions becomes a major,
cooperative challenge for trade and financial services officials and financial authorities, on
the multilateral, regional, and domestic levels. I0 s
Moreover, an integrated understanding of expanding regional approaches to
financial sector development, e.g., with the European Union, 0 9 Mercosur and

106. See Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Processof InternationalBank Regulatoryand
Supervisory Convergence:A New Regulatory Market "Partnership,"AM. REV. BANKING L. 227 (1997).
107. Cf. JOSEPHJ. NORTON, INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OFTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY(1996).

108. Cf.John Howard Jackson, RegardingInternationalEconomic Bebaviours-Reflectionson the BroaderSettings
ofInternationalFinancialMarkets and Institutions, in EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONALFINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, ch. 2 (JosephJ. Norton & Mads T. Andenas eds., 1996). Mary E. Footer,
GATT and Foreign Banking as a Trade in Services, in INTERNATIONAL BANKING OPERATIONS AND PRACTICES:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, ch. 2 (Joseph J. Norton et al. eds., 1994).

109. See, inter alia, Michael L. Gruson, Convergence of Bank PrudentialSupervision Standards and Practices
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NAFTA,II ° will be essential; this will have a heavy public international law dimension.
In all events, the new economic and political dynamics shaping financial markets and
portraying an increasingly globalized environment, the diversity of the underlying cultures
and related values, the disparities in legal systems and approaches through the world, and
the sheer realities of the enormous changes that are occurring within East Asia, Latin
America, Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and
Southern Africa will have a significant impact on the future scope for the study of international economic law, and of financial law in particular. The ongoing need for viable
financial sector law reforms and the growing importance of international and regional cooperative efforts, and of the role of international and regional financial and monetary institutions, will also impact these areas.
Albeit, one could categorize a good portion of these developments as soft law; however,
this does not diminish the legal significance and relevancy for setting new international rules
of the road respecting financial markets and financial institutions, whether private, public,
or intergovernmental in nature, in the global environment of the twenty-first century. I
Law, domestic or international, is not a static notion restricted by history and traditional
notions. Law is indeed a dynamic and evolving concept. While shaped, in part, by history
and while rooted in traditional public international law notions, international law for our
modern global financial system should be capable of embracing and legally responding to
the dramatically changing nature and demands of our international economic, political, and
social environments. In this sense, the traditional legal dichotomies of public and private
law need to give way to a more fluid and relevant view of the dynamics of modern legal
society.
The new global financial law for the twenty-first century will need to be steeped in a rich
mesh of private law, commercial law, corporate law, effective private dispute resolution, and
related areas; even enhanced accounting principles will have to be part of the package. All
of this will need to be within a viable, responsive, yet constitutionally sound, public and
administrative law framework, and will require a sound understanding of public and private
international (conflicts of law) and of the comparative law methodology."2
Yet, still implicit in this search for a viable legal education infrastructure are the traditional
dichotomies between public and private law and between public international law and international business and financial law. The reality though, from a global perspective, is a
confluence and not a divergence among and within these traditional legal categorizations.
But what is a global legal education infrastructure? In a real sense, it represents the
combined and coordinated commitment of the relevant academic and community leaders
to integrate the study of global legal issues within and throughout the legal education
environment and to create a vibrant forum for the ongoing discussion and critical analyses
of key global issues. In effect, global legal education will need to interconnect committed
law faculty members with a core of top domestic and international law students and dynamic
external elements of the local, regional, and international legal and business communities
Within the European Union, in Essays in International Financial & Economic Law, No. 20 (London Institute
of International Banking, Finance and Development Law ed., 1999).
110. See NAFTA: A NEW FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERIcAS (Judith
H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).
111. On notion of "international soft law," see, inter alia, JosEPH J. NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS, chs. 5 and 6 (1995).
112. See Joseph J. Norton, Introductionto Reflections on the Future of Banking Law in the New Hong Kong SAR:
A 25" Anniversary of the University ofHong Kong Law Faculty, 1 Y.B. OFINT'L FIN. &EcON. L. 183-202 (1996).
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in order to create a synergistic environment for training and retooling lawyers, domestic
and international, who will help build the global marketplace in the twenty-first century."I
The effectiveness of traditional legal institutions and paradigms increasingly is being
challenged, eroded, and transformed by the development of more vigorous transnational,
regional, and local institutions, by increasingly intertwined economic and financial markets,
and by the exponential, innovative growth of information technology. This emerging global
environment will necessitate the development of alternative legal and quasi-legal arrangements, standards, and institutions and fundamental constitutional, economic, and commercial law reform within and among the nation-states of the region and of the world. This
will require lawyers capable of shaping and functioning within the new law-based environment, where traditional legal subject-matter categorizations are not controlling, and in
many instances, not relevant.
Global legal education is not primarily about conventional international and comparative
law teaching or about producing lawyers to work in a select group of international law firms
or intergovernmental institutions-although these aspects remain of considerable importance; it is about educating lawyers working in a local-domestic environment to understand
and to be responsive to the sundry effects and implications of globalization and about
lawyers who can assist in affecting appropriate and meaningful policy, legal, and institutional
reforms conducive to sustaining and expanding a global environment. The new global environment significantly will impact most, but not all, areas of traditional legal education,
whether private or public: commercial, business, financial, taxation, energy, environmental,
intellectual property, information technology, litigation and alternative dispute resolution,
healthcare, employment, telecommunications, criminal, administrative, or constitutional.
Thus, the requirement of the new paradigm of globalization represents important challenges for the future legal education. With continuing meaningful sector law reform and
its effective implementation, consistent with evolving international standards and best practices supported by a high-quality, globally-orientated education system, countries will bolster their chances for better safeguarding and avoiding, or least minimizing, the adverse
impact of future financial crisis.
G.

THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET COMPONENT

One of the non-prioritized, and even forgotten, aspects of financial sector reform and
related corporate sector reform has been the provision of an adequate social safety net. It
is only more recently that the inextricable linkage between financial and economic reform
and social issues have been identifiable by the IFIs and industrialized countries as a major
4
priority."
Recent events in the world economy have underlined the important link between economic and social issues; and that good economics depend both on stable relationships between government and their citizens and strong social cohesion. An efficient social system,
by equipping people for change, builds trust, and encourages people to take the risks that
are a necessary part of a competitive modern market. This in turn helps to mitigate the
risks and spread the benefits of globalization. Effective social policy can, in particular, ease

113. See,e.g., John B. Attanasio, A Global Law School for the Metroplex, SMU Law School Brief (Fall
1999).
114. SeeCologne Report, supra note 3, particularly paras. 53-60 (paragraphs quoted are 53 and 54).
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the task of adjustment during times of crises, helping build support for necessary refocus
and ensuring that the burden of adjustment does not fall disproportionately on the poorest
and most vulnerable groups in society.
Though the IMF, World Bank, and Regional Development Banks have begun to incorporate social components into their adjustment, financing, and technical assistance programs, creating complementary social systems that work and that are fundable, presents
one of the greatest, yet most neglected, challenges for the NIFA. ll '
H.

THE NEW ELITE CORP OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS

While the recent G-7 Cologne Report is viewed as focusing primarily on financial sector
reform and emerging markets, what can be overlooked is that this report also directs itself
to reform in industrialized countries. In fact, the genesis of NIFA is rooted in the Basle
Committee processes, a G- 10 concoction, and in the European Community's single financial market efforts of the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, though outside the scope of this article,
this author perceives a dual approach to banking system reform under the NIFA: (i) the
imposition of minimum internationally accepted supervisory standards and practices for
emerging and transitioning economies, and (ii) as to industrialized economies, the making
of a new and evolving governance among government, banking authorities, international
financial institutions, and international commercial banking institutions and conglomerates
in search of grounding a stable, but viable global financial environment.
Expanding and diversifying global banks into even more complex activities and crossborder organizational structures is narrowing the "playing field" of such banks into a fairly
small class of elite global banking institutions. These institutions are necessarily engaged
in intense competition, on a global scale, in all such activities, and undertake greater and
more complex risks to enhance profits.'16 There is little question that the elite global banking institutions generally possess far greater expertise and resources to manage risk exposures, using sophisticated risk measurement and aggregation methodologies, that greatly
exceed the sophistication of other banks and banking authorities. Thus, a dominant trend
in international bank regulation and supervision over the past several years has been to
separate defacto elite banks into their own class for purposes of regulation and supervision
and subtly shift the regulatory and supervisory framework towards more of a "functional
self-regulatory" framework.
This shift has occurred through often opaque maneuvering by the leading domestic and
international banking authorities, such as the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (under the
U.S. Treasury), the key Central Bank Supervisors (e.g., the U.S. Federal Reserve Board of
Governors), and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee) towards
"risk-based supervision" schemes for large global complex banking institutions." 7 This

115. See, e.g., James Wolfensohn (President of World Bank Group), Underlying Human, Social and Structural Problems Must Also Be Addressed, Washington Meeting of Trilateral Commission (1999).

116. See Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer, Moving Forward Into the 21, Century,
Address at the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Williamsburg, Virginia (June 3, 1999) (stating that
the Fed began "sharpening its focus" on 20 U.S. banks and 10 international banks last year in response to
their increasing size and complexity) available at <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/speeches/1999/
19990603.htm>.
117. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency, Large Bank Supervision, in Comptroller's Handbook for Bank
Examination and Supervision (Dec. 1995); Jimmy F. Barton, Supervision By Risk, in ch. 10, Current LegalIssues
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"risk-based supervision" framework essentially redirects responsibility and accountability
for the design, development, and implementation of risk management and internal control
processes to the elite banks themselves, subject to purported oversight and imposition of
general parameters and standards set forth by the authorities.
The movement towards functional self-regulation is primarily evident in the recent market risk amendment to the Basle Capital Accord of 1988 introduced in January 1996, and
recently implemented at the domestic level.,"l The market risk amendment officially
adopted the "internal models" approach for global banks with significant trading operations.
The "internal models" approach authorizes such banks to develop and utilize their own risk
management measurement and aggregation methodologies from the collection of "valueat-risk" (VAR) approaches, subject only to limited quantitative and qualitative parameters
established by the Basle Committee and domestic banking authorities. 119 Thus, the approach essentially provides elite global banks with nearly free reign to determine their
market risk capital requirements using individually tailored VAR methodologies.
This development is further augmented in the capital adequacy context by the proposed
regime change to the Basle Capital Accord for credit risk capital requirements, released in
June 1999.120 Although the proposed regime changes for credit risk do not explicitly incorporate the "internal models" approach for measuring credit risk requirements, a cautious
review indicates an intent to shift responsibility for the design and implementation of credit
risk capital requirements to the banks themselves.' 2 '
The move towards "functional self-regulation" is also predominant in the OTC derivatives context. The international authorities as well as the U.S. banking authorities have
conducted various studies and reviews of the OTC derivatives market since 1993, and have
encountered numerous market events involving OTC derivatives, which arguably demonstrate that a regulatory and supervisory framework for these activities is desirable.," z
Affecting Central Banks (explanation of OCC program by the then-Chief National Bank Examiner, OCC);
Federal Reserve Board, SR 97-24, Risk-FocusedFrameworkfor Supervision of Large Complex Institutions(Oct. 27,
1997) (FRB handbook attachment); Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, Supervision ofFinancialConglomerates (Feb. 1998) (consultation documents released by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs34.htm>.
118. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market
Risks fan. 1996) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24a.htn>.
119. See, e.g., Darryll Hendricks & Beverly Hirtle, Bank CapitalRequirements for Market Risk: The Internal
Models Approacb, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK,
Ecos. POL'v REV. (Dec. 1997), at 1.
120. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, A New Capital Adequacy Framework flune 1999)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.htm>.

121. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Consultative Paperon a New CapitalAdequacyFramework(June
3, 1999) <http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/news/speeches/mcd990603.html>.
122. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission, OTC Derivatives Markets and Their Regulation
(CFTC: Oct. 1993); General Accounting Office, FinancialDerivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial
System, GAO/GGD-94-133 (May 1994); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, FrameworkforSupervisory
Information About the Derivatives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms (May 1995) <http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs003.htm>; General Accounting Office, FinancialDerivatives:ActionsTaken or ProposedSince May 1994,
GAO/GGD/AIMD-97-8 (Nov. 1996); Comptroller of the Currency, Risk Management ofFinancialDerivatives,
Comptroller of the Currency Handbook 0an. 1997); Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Concept Release:
Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998); Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
& Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Supervisory
InformationFrameworkforDerivativesandTradingActivities(Sept. 1998) <http://www.bis.org/pub/bcbs39.htm>;
Bank for International Settlements, Report on OTC Derivatives: Settlement Proceduresand CounterpartyRisk Management (Dec. 1998) <http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy9906.htn>; General Accounting Office, The Commodity
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Nonetheless, the banking institutions and bank authorities have uniformly engaged in considerable efforts to preempt and to stunt any momentum towards adopting any such framework, meaningful accounting standards for these instruments, or even meaningful disclosure and oversight of such activities. 23 This has occurred even as available information
strongly suggests that OTC derivatives and the handful of global elite banks acting as OTC
derivatives dealers assert a dominating influence over the international exchange-traded
financial markets, such as derivatives and equities exchange markets.114
The amendments and proposals for the Basle Capital Accord and OTC derivatives postures are supplemented by various other internationally derived guidance in the form of
best practices for risk management and internal control processes, developed and issued
primarily through the Basle Committee and more importantly in close consultation with
the banking industry groups and other groupings of international financial regulators, e.g.,
IOSCO, Joint Forum, and the Financial Stability Forum.' 25

Exchange Act: Issues Related to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Reauthorization,GAO/GGD-99-74
(May 1999).
123. This has occurred most visibly through the battle over adopting and implementing accounting standards
for OTC derivatives, and in various regulatory authorities collaborating to stifle the CFTC's attempt to raise
and address various unresolved issues pertaining to OTC derivatives in its May 1998 Concept Release. See,
e.g., Greenspan Criticizes FASB Proposal, Urges Use of Fair Value Disclosure, 29 Sec. REG. & L. REP. (BNA),
Aug. 8, 1997, at 1118 (reviewing Greenspan letter urging FASB to drop derivatives accounting rules); CFTC
Release on OTC Derivatives Does Not Go FarEnough, Exchanges Say, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), June 12,
1998, at 908 (reviewing preliminary opposition of U.S. regulatory authorities to CFTC Concept Release on
OTC derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (May 12, 1998)). See also Basle Committee on Banking Supervision &
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Recommendations
for the Public Disclosure of Tradingand DerivativesActivities ofBanks and Securities Firms(Feb. 1999) (joint consultative paper).
124. See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements, Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and
Derivatives Market Activity (1998) <http://bis.org/publ/r fx98.htm>; Cf. Bank for International Settlements,
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity (1995) <http://bis.org/
publ/fx96.htm>; David Folkerts-Landau & Alfred Steinherr, The Wild Beast of Derivatives: To Be Chained Up,
Fenced In or Tamed?, AMEX BANK REVIEW (1995) (on file with author) (OTC derivatives markets rely on
exchange-traded derivatives markets for hedging purposes).
125. See generally Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Operational Risk Management (Sept. 1998)
<http://bis.org/publ/bcbs42.htm>; Basle Committee on Bank Supervision, FrameworkforInternal ControlSystems in Banking Organisations(Sept. 1998) <http://bis.org/publ/bcbs40.htm>; Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision, A Frameworkfor the Evaluation ofInternal Controls (Jan. 1998) <http://bis.org/publ/bcbs33.htm>.
See also Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Risk
Management and Control Guidancefor Securities Firmsand TheirSupervisors (May 1998) <http://www.iosco.org/
docs-public/l 998-riskmanagementand control.htm>; Basle Committee on BankSupervisionIntra-GroupTransactionsand Exposures andRisk ConcentrationsPrinciples (July 1999) <http://bis.org/publ~bcbs51 .htm>. The work
of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, IOSCO, and the Joint Forum (formerly known as the Joint
Forum on Financial Conglomerates, established in 1996 and consisting of members of the Basle Committee,
IOSCO, and the IAIS), are generally well known in the international financial law community. The Financial
Stability Forum was developed following the G-7 Finance Ministers' meeting in Bonn, Germany, in February
1999, at the suggestion of Deutsche Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer. The group is chaired byMr. Andrew
Crockett, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, and consists of finance officials from both developing and developed nations, regulatory authorities, central bankers, and members of international financial
institutions. The group will purportedly focus on three areas designated following the Asian financial crisis: (1)
highly leveraged institutions that have a potential for creating financial market instability through trading activities; (2) offshore centers that are "host" to financial transactions that may be unregulated; and (3) short-term
capital flows and the steps that nations may take to render themselves less vulnerable to volatile capital flows. The
Financial Stability Forum is tasked to report on its endeavors after the next meeting in September 1999.
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All this being said, the trend toward functional self-regulation vis-a-vis the major international banking institutions bonds the fate of success to proactive, constructive, and transparent public-private partnership. The ultimate question remains, however, whether the
international regulators and international banks are up to the task and whether the creation
of an elite group of international banking institutions will prove a wholesome event in the
evolvement of a global financial system.
VI. Concluding Observations: Is There a "New
International Financial Architecture"?
A.

GENERALLY

It has become evident in the wake of recent financial crises that issues of economic and
commercial law reform are of primary political and societal concern. The sustainability of
economic growth, of enhancement of the quality of life, and of the stability of the economic
and financial systems must be a driving imperative for the twenty-first century for all economic systems, whether lesser developed, developing, emerging, transitioning, or industrialized. All of this will require viable, and "safe and sound," financial and commercial law
12 6
systems of considerable sophistication and of high integrity and transparency.
Moreover, it has become apparent since the breakdown of the Bretton Wood's (International Monetary) System in the early 1970s that financial markets around the world have
become and are becoming more and more interconnected and interdependent. As such,
many countries, especially developing, emerging, and transitioning economies, are finding
themselves in a state of major transformation as to the nature and requirements of their
economy and its financial markets. The modern reality is that political and economic power
comes, in part, from developing and sustaining viable and substantial economic and financial
markets-markets that are becoming increasingly internationalized.'27
B.

SEVERAL PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

On the critical importance of the future development of financial law and regulation, and
its relationship to the evolving notion of "public financial law," several preliminary observations can be drawn, particularly as to issues that will be subject to considerable external
regional and international pressures. The recent financial crises in East Asia, Russia, Brazil,
and elsewhere bring this point home.'28
A first observation is that the relationship of law to financial markets and financial institutions is an evolving and diverse process entailing a rich matrix of private and public laws,
of domestic, regional, and international laws, including "soft law," and a mix of statutes,

See Bank for International Settlements Press Release, FinancialStability Forum Establishes Working Groups (May
11, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/press/p99051 l.htm>.
126. See, e.g.,JoHN HOWARDJACKSON, THE WORLDTRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTIONANDJURISPRUDENCE
(1998).
127. See, inter alia,Joseph J. Norton & Douglas Arner, InternationalCo-OperativeEfforts and Implicationsfor
Law Rform, in BANK FAILURES AND BANK INSOLVENCY LAW IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (Rosa M. Lastra &
Henry N. Schiffman eds., 1999).
128. See Joseph J. Norton, FinancialSector Rform and InternationalFinancial Crises: The Legal Challenges,in
INT'L FIN. EcoN. L., No. 16 (London Institute of International Banking, Finance and Development Law ed.,
1998).

VOL. 33, NO. 4

A "NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE?"

925

administrative regulations, and case law. This unfolding legal framework covers both traditional and segregated notions of particular types of financial institutions and broader, more
integrated notions of "financial services" and "financial institutions."' 2 9 As such, "the new
financial law," domestic and international, will require a blend of private and public law. In
all events, this developing area of law will need to become attuned and receptive to these
dramatically and vastly changing notions, to the new legal and economic realities of the
individual countries, to the general growing economic interdependence within the East Asia
Region, and to the more general international financial market developments. 110
A second related observation suggests that the future of domestic financial institutions
and markets will and should continue to be influenced and shaped, in a significant measure,
by external international and regional supervisory developments. These external pressures
may well come to provide the strands for a gradual integration and convergence by "small
steps" respecting the financial systems and markets of individual sovereign nations, and
otherwise should help foster, generally, greater transparency and stability in the financial
markets domestically, regionally, and internationally.' Yet, all this needs to be effected
within a system that embraces a strong "rule of law" and has sound constitutional underpinnings. Again, private and public law are "twinned."
C. A NIFA?
The question remains to be answered, however, as to whether this new web of international standards and principles of financial law constitutes a "new international financial
architecture." Whatever the answer, the initial inquiry is of long-term global significance
and is one that touches upon a fundamental restructuring of existing international economic
and financial institutions; a further evolvement of international "soft law" practices and
standards; a reconfiguration of varying regional and subregional arrangements; and, above
all, a robust and sustained effort of domestic systems to effect fimdamental and long-term
legal, economic, political, social, and educational reform processes. In this sense, there will
be no one comprehensive and defined "new architecture," but a loose, yet complex construct
for seeking long-term domestic, regional, and international stability and equilibrium in
financial and other economic markets.' Looking at it another way, the NIFA terminology,
while vague, serves as a critical code word or point of reference for the ongoing search for
coherency, meaning, effectiveness, and some semblance of structure within what essentially
has become a highly fragmented, volatile, yet interconnected, network of financial markets
and systems (i.e., a non-system). To be flippant, the NIFA is a useful metaphor.
More particularly, the period from 1986 to the present has been one of strengthening of
regulation and supervision of financial institutions and markets, with the overriding goal

129. See Ross

CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW

(1997).

130. SeeJosephJ. Norton, The KoreanFinancialCrisesReform andPositiveTransformation:Isa Second"HanRiver
Miracle" Possible?,27 GLOBAL ECON. REv. 3-36 (1998).
131. See, e.g., Stanley Fischer, Reforming World Finance, Lessonsfrom a Crisis, THE ECONOMIs-r, Oct. 3-9, 1998,
at 23.
132. See generally Cologne Report, supra note 3. See also Working Paper, June 1999; Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, Supervisory Lessons to be Drawnfrom the Asian Crisis (June 1999) <http:///www.bis.org/
pubI/bcbswp2.htm>; U.N. Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs, TowardsaNew International
FinancialArcbitecture(Final Version, Jan. 21, 1999) <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ifa.htm>. Cf., however, a highly critical review of the NIFA by Folkerts-Landau & Garber, supra note 94.
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of achieving "international standards." Further, in this author's view, the period from 1986
to 1995 was really a period of modernization and search for best practices worldwide.
Moreover, the period since the Mexican financial crisis in 1994 and 1995 has seen the
beginning of a new period centered on establishing minimum internationally acceptable
standards of public financial law through a process centered on the Group of Seven, the
Group of Ten, the Basle Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, the Joint Forum, the most recent
Financial Stability Forum, and even the largely private IASC-what may be called the new
"international financial groupings"-and the traditional "international financial institutions" such as the IMF, World Bank Group, and the regional development banks.
Following the financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and Brazil of the past two years,
attention has focused even more on the importance of developing such standards and upon
their implementation into domestic legal systems and regulatory and supervisory practices.
Whether all of this, along with the broader global convergence process mentioned above,
amounts to a "new international financial architecture" is still an open question. 33 Nonetheless, with the development of this new public financial law comes the need for legal
academics to adjust and to train the next generation of lawyers and scholars to understand
and to influence the ongoing process of developing and implementing international standards of public financial law, largely through "soft law" initiatives. In doing so, it should be
kept in mind that this process intersects with fundamental domestic economic law reform,
with varying reconfigurations of regional support frameworks, and with a restructuring of
the old Bretton Woods institutions.

133. In a real sense, the "NIFA" is a misnomer, as the process is not "new," nor purely "international," nor
solely "financial," nor really about any scientific, concrete "architecture." For further consideration, see Chairman Andrew Sheng's article in this issue, andJosephJ. Norton, Is There Really A New International Financial
Architecture?, Presented at the Hong Kong University Global Conference on "The Recent Financial Crises:
Lessons for East Asia" (June 3-4, 1999).
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